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The Burger Court and the Commerce Clause: An
Evaluation of the Role of State Sovereignty
Richard S. Myers*
The Supreme Court has long played an important role in defining the relationship between the federal and state governments.
In particular, the Court's commerce clause' decisions have had a
significant effect on the continuing debate about the appropriate
distribution of governmental power. The Court's decisions have, in
addition, frequently sparked debate about the Court's role in these
fundamental issues of governmental structure.
The Burger Court has been no exception. The Court's decisions-particularly those in the commerce clause area-have figured prominently in the continuing debate about the distribution of
power between the federal government and the states. In general,
the Burger Court has given far greater emphasis to state sovereignty in deciding cases involving federal/state relations. These
decisions have been among the most controversial of the last fifteen
years.
In the 1960's, state sovereignty did not play a significant part in
the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence. The Warren Court re2
affirmed Congress' expansive power under the commerce clause
3
and rejected the view that the tenth amendment limited this congressional power. 4 The Court greatly expanded the scope of federal authority in other areas as well. For example, the expansion of
section 1983 actions and of the incorporation doctrine transformed
much of state tort and criminal law-previously the virtually exclusive province of the states-into federal constitutional law. 5 By
*

Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. The author served as co-

counsel for the petitioner in South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237
(1984), which is discussed in this article. The author would like to thank Robert H. Lande,
Judith A. McMorrow, Mollie A. Murphy, and Joe Sims for reading an earlier draft of this
article and offering helpful comments and suggestions.
1 The commerce clause provides: "Congress shall have power. . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
3 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
4 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
5 See Bator, Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 54
(1982).
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1970, a noted constitutional authority could state, with little fear of
6
contradiction, that "[flederalism is dead."
The Burger Court has, at a minimum, changed the rhetoric
substantially. In a variety of areas, 7 the Court has manifested a solicitude for state sovereignty." Perhaps the most controversial of
the Burger Court's decisions have been in the commerce clause
area. The Court has carved out two related state sovereignty limitations on the scope of the commerce clause: the National League of
Cities9 doctrine, which the Court recently abandoned,10 and the
"market participant" doctrine."1 This article discusses both of
these limitations and evaluates the Burger Court's view of state sovereignty. In addition, this article adresses a third, closely related
area: the Burger Court's treatment of state action immunity from
12
the antitrust laws.
The article concludes that the Burger Court's effort to revive
state sovereignty in the commerce clause area has been a failure, at
least on a doctrinal level. In addition, on a practical level, the
Court's decisions have little altered "the legal hegemony of the national government." 1 3 The Court has, however, been successful in
furthering the dialogue about the role of the states vis-a-vis the national government. In the long run, this effort to highlight the
states' role in our constitutional structure may well have a salutary
impact.
6

P. KURLAND, PoLrrIcs, THE CONsTrruTION,

AND THE WARREN COURT

96 (1970).

7 Abstention: See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982) (Younger applies to noncriminal state proceedings when "important state interests are involved"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Habeas
corpus: See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976). Eleventh amendment: See, e.g., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 53 U.S.L.W.
4985 (U.S. June 28, 1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900
(1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Preemption: See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectiveson Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); see Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: TheJudicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 885-89 (1979). See generally Ripple &
Kenyon, State Sovereignty-A PolishedBut Slippeiy Crown, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 745 (1979).
8 One article justifiably claims that federalism is the organizing principle of Justice
Rehnquist's constitutional philosophy. See Powell, The CompleatJeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist
and Federalism, 91 YALE LJ. 1317 (1982). For a recent example ofJustice Rehnquist's willingness to defer to the states, see Supreme Court of N. H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 128185 (1985) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court's holding that New Hampshire rule limiting bar admission to state residents violates the privileges and immunities
clause).
9 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
11 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
12 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
13 Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism",43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 39
(Summer 1980).
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I. National League of Cities and the Temporary Revival of the
Tenth Amendment
A.

The Case Law

1. Maryland v. Wirtz
The Warren Court's expansive construction of the commerce
clause was not revolutionary. The doctrine of "dual federalism,"
which restricted the scope of the commerce clause, had long since
been abandoned. 14 In United States v. Darby,' 5 Justice Stone stated
that the tenth amendment did not restrict congressional power
under the commerce clause:
Our conclusion [that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1936 is
constitutional] is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment....
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or
that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.' 6
Together with an expansive view of congressional power under the
commerce clause, 17 the Court's view of the tenth amendment
greatly enhanced the national government's power in relation to
the states. By and large, these aspects of commerce clause jurispru8
dence remained settled over the next thirty years.'
Thus, the Warren Court's decision in Maryland v. Wirtz' 9 was
well within the mainstream of commerce clause precedent. In
Wirtz, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress' decision
to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act to state operated schools and
hospitals. Twenty-eight states and one school district argued "that
the Act may not be constitutionally applied to state-operated institutions because [the commerce] power must yield to state sovereignty in the performance of governmental functions." 20 The
Court bluntly rejected this argument as "simply . . . not ten14

See generally Corwin, The Passingof Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).

15

312 U.S. 100 (1941).

16
17
18
1937,

Id. at 123-24.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
As Professor Tribe states: "Until 1976, the conventional wisdom was that, since
there have been no judicially-enforceable limits on congressional power which derive
from considerations of federalism." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-20, at
300 (1978).
19 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
20 Id. at 195.
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able." 21 The Court stated that United States v. California22 had settled that "[i]f a State is engaging in economic activities that are
validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by
private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation." 23 Writing for the majority, Justice
Harlan concluded: "[The Court] will not carve up the commerce
power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on
commerce from private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run by the States for the benefit of their citizens." 24 In a dissent joined by Justice Stewart, Justice Douglas
asserted that "what is done here is . . . such a serious invasion of

state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in
25
my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism."
2. National League of Cities
In 1975, in Fry v. United States,26 the Burger Court reaffirmed
Wirtz. In Fy, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, which authorized the President to
limit salary increases of state employees. Although it relied on
Wirtz, the Court appeared to signal a revival of tenth amendmentbased limits on congressional power. The Court said:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism", . . . it is not without significance. The Amendment ex-

pressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the State's integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite
the extravagant claims on this score made by some amid, we are
convinced that the wage restriction regulations
constituted no
such drastic invasion of state sovereignty. 27
Emphasizing the limited scope of the statute at issue in Wirtz, the
Court concluded: "The federal regulation in [Fry] is even less intrusive. Congress enacted the Economic Stabilization Act as an
emergency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the
national economy." 28 The Court noted that excluding state and local government employees from coverage would have drastically
21 Id.
22 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
23 392 U.S. at 197. The Court explicitly rejected the relevance of the governmental/proprietary distinction: "[I]t is clear that the Federal Government, when acting within a
delegated power, may override countervailing state interests whether these be described as
'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character." Id. at 195.
24 Id. at 198-99 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
27 Id. at 547 n.7.
28 Id. at 548.
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29
impaired the effectiveness of the federal legislation.
Alone in dissent, Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Douglas'
dissenting statement in Wirtz: " 'If all this can be done, then the
National Government could devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amend3
ment.' 30 Relying on the intergovernmental tax immunity cases '
32
and the basic concept of constitutional federalism, Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress should not be permitted to regulate the
wages paid by a state to employees of facilities closely allied with
Justice Rehnquist also
traditional state functions. 3 3 Moreover,
34
Wirtz.
overrule
to
urged the Court
Just one year after Fry, 35 Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that
the Court reverse Wirtz commanded majority support. In National
League of Cities v. Usery,3 6 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, overruled
Wirtz and held "that insofar as the challenged amendments [to the
Fair Labor Standards Act] operate to directly displace the State's
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."37 Now writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist repeated his argument in Fry that congressional regulation of private citizens differs from congressional regulation of the
states. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he difference. . . is that a
State is not merely a factor in the 'shifting economic arrangements'
of the private sector of the economy,. . . but is itself a coordinate
established by the Framers for governing our
element in the system
38
Federal Union."
The Court found that applying the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to the states and their political subdivisions would

29 Id.
30 Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
31 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
32 421 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist disclaimed reliance on
the Tenth Amendment "by its terms." Id.
33 Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that this
"standard" would prompt difficult line-drawing issues. The Justice suggested that either
the governmental/proprietary distinction or a traditional/nontraditional state function distinction might prove useful, but concluded that it was "unnecessary to engage in the business of line drawing [in Fry], since the regulation in question sweeps within its ambit
virtually all state employees regardless of their tasks." Id. at 558 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
34 Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 Fry was decided just one month after National League of Cities was argued for the first
time.
36 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
37 Id. at 852 (footnote omitted).
38 Id. at 849 (citation omitted) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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"significantly alter or displace the States' ability to structure employer-employee relationships. . . [in such] integral governmental
functions . . . [as] fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation." 3 9 The statute therefore
did "not comport with the federal system of government embodied
in the Constitution." 40 Congress had acted unconstitutionally because it had "sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to function effectively in a federal
system.' "41
Justice Blackmun, who provided the crucial fifth vote, joined in
Justice Rehnquist's opinion and also filed a short concurring opinion. The concurring opinion contained this caveat: "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it adopts a
balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas
such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with im42
posed federal standards would be essential."
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan argued that "there is no
restraint [on Congress' exercise of the commerce power] based on
state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution; our decisions over the last
century and a half have explicitly rejected the existence of any such
restraint on the commerce power."43 Accusing the majority of substituting their judgment for "a congressional judgment with which
they disagree," 44 Justice Brennan declared "[i]t unacceptable that
the judicial process should be thought superior to the political process in this area." 45 Extending the thesis of Professor Wechsler's
famous article, 46 Justice Brennan maintained that "U]udicial restraint in this area merely recognizes that the political branches of
our Government are structured to protect the interests of the
States, as well as the Nation as a whole, and that the States are fully
47
able to protect their own interests in the premises."
39 426 U.S. at 851.
40 Id. at 852.
41 Id. (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7).
42 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This position has been criticized. See,
e.g., Kaden, supra note 7, at 888 ("a balancing test is not the solution here .... "). For a
more general criticism of balancing tests, see generally Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1022 (1978).
43 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 867 (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46 See generally Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 543 (1954). See J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) for a full elaboration ofJustice Brennan's political representation rationale.
47 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Subsequent Limitations on the Scope of National
League of Cities

The decision in National League of Cities met with almost univer49
sal criticism, 48 and the Court subsequently narrowed the doctrine.
In fact, despite several opportunities to do so, the Court never
struck down a statute under the doctrine.50
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,5 1 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977. First the Court concluded that the
Act, which regulated the use of private lands within the borders of
the states, fell within the scope of Congress' commerce power. 52
48 See, e.g.,J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REViEW 224 n.44
(1980); Alfange, CongressionalRegulation of the "States Qua States'". From NationalLeague of Cities
to EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 215; Barber, NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery: New
Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161; Choper, The Scope of NationalPower
Vis-a-Vis the States: The DispensabilityofJudicial Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552 (1977); Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 19-25 (1978); Tushnet,
Constitutionaland Statutory Analyses in the Law of FederalJurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1301,
1322-24 (1978).
49 Even prior to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005
(1985), some commentators concluded that the Court had "narrowed" National League of
Cities into oblivion. See, e.g., Note, The Repudiation of National League of Cities: The Supreme
Court Abandons the State Sovereignty Doctrine, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1048 (1984).
The cases illustrate the Court's narrowing of the doctrine. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 236-39 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 683-90 (1982); and Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-88 (1981). Prior to Garcia, National League
of Cities applied only to congressional exercises of the commerce power. NationalLeague of
Cities did not limit congressional authority under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287 n.28; Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977); cf Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (principle of state sovereignty embodied in the eleventh amendment limited by § 5 of the fourteenth amendment). The Court had not indicated the extent to which National League of Cities applied to congressional authority under
the spending power, see NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17, or the war power. See
id. at 855 n.18. Professor Rotunda stated:
• . .NationalLeague of Cities has been interpreted as an attempt to limit solely Congress's power under the commerce clause. Many lower courts, subsequently faced
with tenth amendment challenges to federal legislaton enacted pursuant to the
spending power, war powers, or the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment,
have, therefore, announced that the National League of Cities analysis is simply
inapplicable.
Rotunda, The Doctrine of ConditionalPreemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 289, 296 (1984) (footnote omitted).
50 Professor Graglia stated that NationalLeague of Cities, as limited by Hodel, "hardly rises
to the status of an aberration, applying at most to certain direct national controls of the
administration of state government." Graglia, In Defense of "Federalism", 6 HARV.J. OF L. &
PuB. POL'Y 23, 27 n.5 (1982).
51 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
52 Id. at 275-83. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist stated "that one of the
greatest 'fictions' of our federal system is that the Congress exercises only those powers
delegated to it, while the remainder are reserved to the States or to the people." Id. at 307
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). After reviewing the Court's expansive interpretations of the
scope of the commerce power, including Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and Perez
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The Court then rejected a challenge to the Act based on the NationalLeague of Cities doctrine.5 3 In so holding, the Court refined the
test established in National League of Cities:
[A] claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy
each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that
the challenged statute regulates the "States as States"

. .

. Sec-

ond, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty" . . . And third, it

must be apparent that the states' compliance with the federal
law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral
op'5 4
erations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
In addition, the Court stated in a footnote that "[d]emonstrating
that these three requirements are met does not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce
power action will succeed. There are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state
submission." 55
The Court followed this basic approach in three other recent
cases: United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co.;56
FERC v. Mississippi;57 and EEOC v. Wyoming.5 8 In United Transportation, a unanimous Court concluded that the tenth amendment did
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971),Justice Rehnquist asserted: "Despite the holdings of
these cases, and the broad dicta often contained therein, there are constitutional limits on
the power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause." 452 U.S. at 309
(Rehnquist,J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The Justice concluded that "[olur cases
have consistently held that the regulated activity must have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce," id. at 310-11 (emphasis in original), and that "[t]hough there can be no doubt
that Congress in regulating surface mining has stretched its authority to the 'nth degree,'
our prior precedents compel me to agree with the Court's conclusion." Id. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 283-93.
54 Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the first of the three
requirements had not been satisfied; the Act governed only "the activities of coal mine
operators who are private individuals and businesses." Id. at 288. The Court rejected the
assumption that the tenth amendment limits congressional authority to preempt or displace
state regulation of private activities having the requisite effect on interstate commerce. Id.
at 289-90.
55 Id. at 288 n.29 (citing Fy and Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National
League of Cities).
56 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
57 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
58 460 U.S. 226 (1983). Although it relegated the issue to a footnote, the Court rejected a National League of Cities "defense" in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150 (1983). There, the Court held that the sale of
pharmaceutical products to state and local government hospitals for resale in competition
with private pharmacies was not exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. The Court stated:
"The retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs is not 'indisputably' an attribute of state sovereignty. . . . It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under
its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities." 460 U.S. at
154 n.6 (citations omitted).
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not prohibit applying the Railway Labor Act to a state owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated that the
"operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is not an
integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from
federal regulation under National League of Cities." 59 Operating a
passenger railroad "has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state or local governments." 60 Chief Justice Burger's
opinion thus emphasized that the third prong of the Hodel test was
determinative.
In FERC v. Mississippi, the Court upheld certain portions of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). Titles I
and III of PURPA direct state regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities to "consider" adopting and implementing certain
regulatory standards. These titles also prescribe procedures to be
followed in considering the proposed standards and set forth reporting requirements. Section 210 of Title II of PURPA encourages the development of cogeneration and small power production
facilities and directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"), in consultation with the state regulatory authorities, to
promulgate rules to further this goal. Section 210 also requires the
state regulatory authorities to implement these rules and authorizes
FERC to exempt cogeneration and small power production facilities from certain state and federal regulations.
Justice Blackmun, writing for four other Justices, stated that
the issue presented in FERC v. Mississippi differed from those addressed in Fry and National League of Cities, both of which involved
claims that the states were immune from generally applicable federal regulations. In FERC v. Mississippi, however, Congress tried to
"use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals." 6 1 Noting similarities to the Surface Mining Act involved in Hodel, the
Court held "only that Congress may impose conditions on the
62
State's regulation of private conduct in a pre-emptible area."
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, emphasized that PURPA prescribed administrative and judicial procedures that the states were required to follow in considering whether
to adopt the proposed regulation. He thus concluded that, "[a]t
least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth Amend59 455 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 686 (footnote omitted). Although it did state that it did not mean "to impose a
static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation," id., the
Court concluded that "there is no justification for a rule which would allow the states, by
acquiring functions previously performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority
in areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation." Id. at 687.
61 456 U.S. at 759.
62 Id. at 769 n.32. See generally Rotunda, supra note 49.
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ment."6 3 Justice O'Connor, writing for the ChiefJustice andJustice
Rehnquist, strongly defended state sovereignty, and concluded that
"Titles I and III of PURPA conscript state utility commissions into
the national bureaucratic army. This result is contrary to the principles of National League of Cities v. Usery, ... antithetical to the values
64
of federalism, and inconsistent with our constitutional history."
In EEOC v. Wyoming, another 5-4 decision, 65 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of applying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") to state and local governments. Justice Brennan, who had long been a critic of the National League of
Cities doctrine,6 6 explained:
The principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities
is a functional doctrine

. . .

whose ultimate purpose is not to

create a sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure that
the unique benefits of a federal system in which the States enjoy
a 'separate and independent existence,'.

. .

not be lost through

67
undue federal interference in certain core state functions.
Justice Brennan concluded that the ADEA's intrusion "is sufficiently less serious than it was in National League of Cities so as to
express choice to
make it unnecessary for us to override Congress's
68
extend its regulatory authority to the States."
63 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64 Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
65 460 U.S. 226 (1983). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
formed the majority. ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
were again in dissent. It has often been observed thatJustice Blackmun has played the key
role in the National League of Cities cases:
The entire scope of federal control of state or local governments remains uncertain, since the difference between the outcome of NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery
and FERC v. Mississippi or EEOC v. Wyoming is solely the way in which Justice Blackmun strikes a balance between competing federal and state concerns. While Justice Blackmun's balancing of such interests is not the "law" of these cases in a
technical sense, it is his vote which at the moment is determinative because the
other eight justices are now evenly split between a position advocating judicial
deference to the congressional definition of commerce power over state and local
governments and active judicial scrutiny of the permissible scope of such power.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 181 (2d ed. 1983) (footnote omitted); see also Note, National League of Cities v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming: Evolution of a
BalancingApproachto Tenth Amendment Analysis, 1984 DUKE LJ. 601, 619-20. Of course, it was
Justice Blackmun who, in Garcia,provided the crucial fifth vote to overrule NationalLeague of
Cities.
66 See, e.g., National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1978).
67 460 U.S. at 236 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841).
68 Id. at 239. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, after reviewing some of the
history of the commerce clause, argued that the Court should reverse National League of
Cities:
Congress may not, of course, transcend specific limitations on its exercise of the
commerce power that are imposed by other provisions of the Constitution. But
there is no limitation in the text of the Constitution that is even arguably applica-
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In dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, concluded that the ADEA violated both
69
the three prong Hodel test and Justice Blackmun's balancing test.
In a separate dissent joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Powell
contested Justice Stevens' view of the history of the commerce
clause 70 and declared:
State sovereignty remains a fundamental component of our system that this Court has recognized time and time again ...
[A]ll of the evidence reminds us of the importance of the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. The Founding
Fathers, and those who participated in the earliest phases of
constitutional development, understood the States' reserved
powers to be a limitation on the power of Congress-including
its power under the Commerce Clause. And the Court
7 1 has recognized and accepted this fact for almost 200 years.
ble to this case. The only basis for questioning the federal statute at issue here is
the pure judicial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery. Neither the Tenth Amendment, nor any other provision of the Constitution, affords any support for that judicially constructed limitation on the scope of
the federal power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. In my opinion,
that decision must be placed in the same category as [E.C. Knight, Hammer v.
Dagenhart, and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. ]--cases whose subsequent rejection is now
universally regarded as proper. I think it so plain that National League of Cities not
only was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of
the Constitution itself, that it is not entitled to the deference that the doctrine of
stare decisis ordinarily commands for this Court's precedents. Notwithstanding my
respect for that doctrine, I believe that the law would be well served by a prompt
rejection of NationalLeague of Cities' modem embodiment of the spirit of the Articles of Confederation.
Id. at 248-50 (footnotes omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring).
69 In FERC, Justice O'Connor, in discussing the balancing codicil to the three prong
Hodel test, see notes 42 & 55 supra and accompanying text, stated: "Neither [Hodel nor United
Transportation Union] . . . involved such an exception to National League of Cities, and the
Court has not yet explored the circumstances that might justify such an exception." FERC,
456 U.S. at 778 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70 In his concurring opinion in FERC, Justice Stevens stated that the commerce clause
"was the Framers' response to the centralproblem that gave rise to the Constitution itself."
460 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See note 68 supra. In his dissent, Justice Powell responded:
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between the States was one of
the Constitution's purposes. I suggest, however, that there were other purposes
of equal or greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification issue in the state conventions. No doubt there were differences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings
of the Articles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that few of the
Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers among the States were 'the central
problem,' or that their elimination was the 'central mission' of the Constitutional
Convention. Creating a National Government within a federal system was far
more central than any 18th-century concern for interstate commerce.
Id. at 265-66 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Alfange, supra note 48, at 270-80 (discussing the
Stevens/Powell dispute).
71 460 U.S. at 273-75 (footnote omitted) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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4. National League of Cities Abandoned: Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority
On February 19, 1985, the Court, in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 72 adopted Justice Stevens' suggestion 73 and
overruled National League of Cities. In Garcia, the district court had
held that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system constituted a traditional governmental function. Thus, the
mass-transit system was exempt from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA")
under National League of Cities.74 In a 5-4 decision, 75 the Court reversed the district court's decision and overruled National League of
Cities.76
Justice Blackmun, who had supplied the critical fifth vote in National League of Cities, wrote the majority opinion in Garcia. Justice
Blackmun concluded that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of
state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental
function' is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with established
principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism
77
principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest."
The opinion emphasized the Court's failure to define "the scope of
governmental functions deemed protected under National League of
Cities,"7 8 the lower courts' struggles with the doctrine, 7 9 and the
Court's abandonment of the governmental/proprietary distinction
in the intergovernmental tax immunity cases.8 0 In addition, the
Court noted that in all likelihood "alternative standards that might
72
73
74

105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring).
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex.

1983). Garcia intervened as a defendant at the district court level. Garcia and the Secretary
of Labor filed separate jurisdictional statements. The two cases-Nos. 82-1913 and 821951-were consolidated.
75 Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion for Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens. Justice Powell wrote a dissent, which was joined by the Chief Justice, and

Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissent, and Justice
O'Connor wrote a dissent, in which Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined. Garcia was first
argued on Mar. 19, 1984. On July 5, 1984, the Court returned the case to the calendar for

reargument and requested the parties to brief and argue the question "'[w]hether or not
the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in NationalLeague of Cities v. Use)y, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered.' " 104 S. Ct. 3582, 3583 (1984).
76 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
77 Id. at 1007 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852). Justice Blackmun's
emphasis on state regulatoiy immunity may be an effort to save market participantimmunity.
See notes accompanying Section II infra. In 1980,Justice Blackmun stated that, "[t]he basic

distinction . . .between States as market participants and States as market regulators
makes good sense and sound law." Reeves, Inc. v. State, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980).
78 105 S. Ct. at 1011.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1014 (discussing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)).
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be employed to distinguish between protected and unprotected
"81
governmental functions . . . [would not be] manageable ....
The Court therefore "reject[ed], as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' "82 Such an approach "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it
dislikes." 8 3
In Garcia, the Court also emphasized a structural approach.
Justice Blackmun noted that "the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself 4 . . . [and that] the Framers chose to
rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power
over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National
Government itself."8 5 Justice Blackmun therefore asserted that
"[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." 86 The
Court, however, did not reject the possibility that the judiciary
might limit certain federal intrusions on state sovereignty, 8 7 but it
8 Jusemphasized that such limitations should be narrowly drawn
tice Blackmun concluded that in Garcia the national political process had adequately protected state sovereignty. 8 9
Justice Powell's dissent contended that the Court had substantially altered the federal system created by the Constitution and had
81 Id. at 1014.
82 Id. at 1016.
83 Id. at 1015.
84 Id. at 1017.
85 Id. at 1018.
86 Id.
87 Thus, Justice Blackmun did not adopt Dean Choper's position that federalism issues
should be nonjusticiable. See generally J. CHOPER, supra note 46. Justice Blackmun mentioned that there "undoubtedly" are limits on the federal government's ability to interfere
with state functions, see 105 S. Ct. at 1016, but suggested thatjudicial intervention would be
appropriate only if the national political process had not worked as intended. The scope of
this limit is unclear. Justice Blackmun stated that "[tihese cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal
action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." 105 S. Ct. at 1020. A citation to
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), however, suggests thatJustice Blackmun would be
concerned about federal actions that treat a single state or region differently from the way
in which other parts of the country are treated.
88 Justice Blackmun declared that: "Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political
process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.' " 105 S. Ct. at 1019-20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236).
89 Id. at 1020
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reduced the "Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric. ..."90
Justice Powell stated that National League of Cities adopted a familiar
type of balancing test." 9' 1 He also observed that EEOC v. Wyoming
articulated a "functional" test, which eliminated the speculation
that National League of Cities created "a sacred province of state autonomy." 92 Questioning whether the national political process affords sufficient protection for state sovereignty, 93 Justice Powell
stated that reliance on the political process did not justify evading
judicial review. He declared that "It]he States' role in our system of
government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative
grace." 94 According to Justice Powell, "judicial enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so
carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution. ' ' 9 5

Justice Powell stated that judicial intervention under a balancing test was required on the facts presented because "the state interest is compelling." 96 Although he observed that "municipal
operation of an intra-city mass transit system is relatively new in the
life of our country," Justice Powell stated that "[i]t nevertheless is a
classic example of the type of service traditionally provided by local
government. It is local by definition." 97 Sustaining application of
the FLSA to the city transit system, Justice Powell believed, "makes
Justice Douglas's fear [that the Court's commerce clause analysis
allows the federal government to violate state sovereignty] once
98
again a realistic one."

Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia focused on the fundamental changes wrought by "the emergence of an integrated and industrialized national economy. . . ."99 These changes brought an

expansion of congressional power under the commerce clause, 0 0
an expansion necessary to allow the Congress "sufficient power to
Justice O'Connor advised that readdress national problems."''
90

Id. at 1022 (Powell, J., dissenting).

91

Id. at 1024 (Powell, J., dissenting).

92 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236).
93 Justice Powell expressed doubts about the "malfunction of the 'political process'"
limit identified, but not defined, by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 1025 n.7 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
94 Id. at 1026 (Powell, J., dissenting).

95 Id. at 1028 (Powell, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
98 Id. at 1033 (Powell, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Douglas' comment in dissent
in Maryland v. Wirtz, see text accompanying note 25 supra).
99 Id. at 1034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1972); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.

United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
101

Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1034 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
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cent changes in the workings of Congress, which "may well have
lessened the weight Congress gives to the legitimate interests of
States as States,"10 2 must be considered in the context of the development of Congress' commerce power. Justice O'Connor feared
that "[a]s a result [of these recent changes], there is now a real risk
that Congress will gradually erase the diffusion of power between
state and nation on which the Framers based their faith in the effi03
ciency and vitality of our Republic."'
Justice O'Connor therefore concluded that congressional action "must not contravene the spirit of the Constitution."1 04 Observing that state autonomy should be relevant in assessing the
propriety of the means by which Congress exercises its powers, Justice O'Connor stated: "This principle requires the Court to enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to
complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstate commerce power."1 0 5 The dissent argued that the protections of the
political process do not justify judicial reliance on Congress' "underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint." 10 6 According to Justice
O'Connor, "It]he proper resolution. . lies in weighing state autonomy as a factor in the balance when interpreting the means by
which Congress can exercise its authority on the States as
0 7
States."1
Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, indicated that the district
court's judgment in Garcia could be affirmed under any one of several approaches. 0 8 Justice Rehnquist stated, however, "I do not
think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the
fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court."' 109 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor also sounded this refrain: "I would not
shirk the duty acknowledged by NationalLeague of Cities and its prog102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 1035 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1036 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id. at 1037 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's language recalls Justice Stone's

famous phrase: "[Tihe only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of selfrestraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (StoneJ, dissenting). It is ironic
that a judicial conservative should express dismay about reliance on the "restraint" of the
politically accountable branches of government.
107 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor emphasized
the distinction that played such a key role in NationalLeague of Cities-the difference between
federal regulation of a state and federal regulation of a private entity.
108 Justice Rehnquist identified four approaches that would support affirmance: 1) the
majority's test in National League of Cities; 2) Justice Blackmun's balancing test from National
League of Cities; 3) Justice Powell's test in Garcia;and 4) Justice O'Connor's test in Garcia. Id.
at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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eny, and I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in
time again assume its constitutional responsibility."' 1 0
B. Assessment
The Court's opinion in National League of Cities had, of course,
received sharp criticism." 1 Although the criticism took a variety of
forms, two arguments received the most attention. The first argument posited that the Court in National League of Cities departed
from the historical understanding about the constitutional basis for
a judicially enforceable state sovereignty limitation on the exercise
of the commerce power. 112 The second argument was that the
Court's intervention to protect state sovereignty was inappropriate
because the states are adequately represented in the national political process.113
The first argument was based on the Court's earliest commerce
clause opinions. ChiefJustice Marshall expressed the early understanding that the tenth amendment did not limit the powers of the
national government. 114 Under this theory, Congress has plenary
power when acting within the scope of an affirmative power. 15 As
Marshall explained in Gibbons v. Ogden, 16 the Constitution does not
sanction judicial interference with congressional action within the
scope of the commerce power. 17 Prior to National League of Cities,
110 Id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111 See commentary collected at note 48 supra. The decision does, however, have a few
defenders. See, e.g., Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 81. Some commentators, without endorsing NationalLeague of
Cities, argue that the Court has some role to play in restricting federal legislation that has
significant effects on state and local governments. See, e.g., Kaden, supra note 7; Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalismin MandatingState Implementation of NationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and
the New Federalism 89 HARv.L. REv. 1871 (1976).
112 See, e.g., Alfange, supra note 48, at 275; Tushnet, supra note 48, at 1322.
113 J. CHOPER, supra note 46, at 171-259. Some commentators have criticized National
League of Cities on the ground that there are no judicially manageable standards for implementing a state sovereignty based limitation on the commerce power. See, e.g., Tushnet,
supra note 48, at 1324-28. In Garcia, Justice Blackmun explained that the failure to develop
workable standards in this area played an important role in his decision to reverse his position. 105 S.Ct. at 1007. Professor Nagel correctly noted that the "lack of standards" argument can also be made against judicial review of legislation affecting individual rights, and
that the judicial restraint argument in the National League of Cities context reflects an undervaluing of "structural values." See Nagel, supra note 111, at 95. "Activism" in the context
of individual rights, however, does not necessarily justify "activism" in another context.
The proper position should rely on the political process in both areas.
114 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-07 (1819).
115 See generally Barber, supra note 48.
116 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
117 Chief Justice Marshall stated:
[T]he wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many
other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which
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this interpretation had been considered settled.1 1 8
The second argument,1 1 9 which ultimately proved so important
in Garcia, was that the courts need not exercise their power ofjudicial review to protect state sovereignty. The national political process allegedly provides adequate protection for the states. As Dean
Choper characterizes the argument:
The point . . . is not that any of these exercises of national
power (suppositional or real) is in fact constitutional as a matter
of abstract principle. . . . [C]ertain federal regulations. . . may
transgress the constitutional principle of federalism ....
Rather, the position is that judicial review is not the steadfast
brake to be relied on to prevent the destruction of state sovereignty. . . . [T]he states can and should depend on the national
political branches,20 not the federal judiciary, for the preservation
of states' rights.'
According to this view, absent a violation of a specific constitutional
provision, the courts should only overturn legislative judgments if
the interests involved were unable to secure a fair hearing for their
views. 1 2 1 In the commerce clause context, such intervention is unnecessary because the states are adequately represented in the na12 2
tional political process.
These arguments are substantial-and in Garcia they were substantial enough to persuade five Justices to overrule National League
of Cities. Although this is not the place for a full treatment of the
issue, the Court reached the proper result in Garcia. And contrary
they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which
people must rely solely, in all representative governments.
Id. at 197; see F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE 40 (1937). Justice Frankfurter observed:
Marshall not merely rejected the Tenth Amendment as an active principle of limitation; he countered with his famous characterization of the powers of Congress,
and of the commerce power in particular, as the possession of the unqualified authority of a unitary sovereign. He threw the full weight of his authority against the
idea that, apart from specific restrictions in the Constitution, the very existence of
the states operates as such a limitation.
118 See, e.g., National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 861-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); L.
TRIBE, supra note 18, § 5-20, at 300; The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 199

(1983).
119 NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 456 (1978).
120 J. CHOPER, supra note 46, at 220-21 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan apparently
would deny that federal regulations can transgress the constitutional principles of federalism. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting); seeJ. CHOPER, supra
note 46, at 221 (disagreeing with Justice Brennan on this point).
121 This is, of course, a specific example of Dean Ely's theory of judicial review. See
generallyJ. ELY, supra note 48.
122 SeeJ. CHOPER, supra note 46, at 176-90; M. PERRY, THE CONSTIrrUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 46-49, 58-59 (1982); Tushnet, supra note 48, at 1328-37. Some have

disagreed with the view that state representation in the national political process affords
sufficient protection for state sovereignty. See Kaden, supra note 7, at 857-68.
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to Justice Powell's concern in Garcia,12 3 overruling NationalLeague of
Cities does not read the tenth amendment out of the Constitution.' 2 4 Judicial enforcement is not necessary to give meaning to a
2
constitutional provision.' 5
Although the Court does not view the tenth amendment as a
judicially enforceable, substantive restraint on congressional authority under the commerce clause, the amendment will still serve
an important function. 2 6 First, as Justice Brennan noted, the tenth
amendment and principles of federalism are useful guides in statutory construction. The Court is correctly reluctant to interpret federal legislation in a way that would alter the balance of power
between the federal government and the states.' 2 7 Second, the Justices are not the only ones who swear to uphold the Constitution.
The tenth amendment and principles of federalism will still serve as
constraints on Congress when it considers proposed legislation that
28
would seriously intrude upon state and local governments.'
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman'2 9 illustrates the
first point.' 3 0 In Pennhurst, the Court held that The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (the "Act") did not
create any substantive rights for the mentally retarded to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment. The Act
established a federal-state grant program of financial assistance
from the federal government to participating states. States could
comply with the conditions in the Act or forego federal funding.
The Court considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 6010, the Act's "bill of
rights" provision, created enforceable rights and obligations. In an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court acknowledged that "Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to
3
the States."' '
The Court, however, then stated:
123 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1022 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("today's decision effectively
reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric").
124 This appears to be of concern. See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-48; Fy,
421 U.S. at 547 n.7 ("the Tenth Amendment. .. is not without significance").
125 See Tushnet, supra note 48, at 1343.
126 Justice Blackmun's opinion did indicate that there are some affirmative limits on congressional power, but these limits inhere in process, not result. The scope of this limit is
not yet clear. See Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1025 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 858 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally
L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 5-20, at 304-05; Tushnet, supra note 48, at 1343. Cf. MolinaEstrada v. Puerto-Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 846 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying National
League of Cities as an aid in statutory construction).
128 Tushnet, supra note 48, at 1343.
129 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
130 See generally McConnell, The Politics of Returning Power to the States, 6 HARv. J. OF L. &
PUB. POL'Y 103 (1982).

131

451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted).
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The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power. . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." . . . There can,
of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the
conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. . .. By
insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the
States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the con1 32
sequences of their participation.

In a footnote, the Court stated: "There are limits on the power of
Congress to impose conditions on the States pursuant to its spending power. . see NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery. . . ."133 Greatly
influenced by the "massive financial obligations"'' 34 that would
have been imposed on the states and by congressional unwillingness to fund these obligations,13 5 the Court held that section 6010
was merely precatory. Thus, as Pennhurst illustrates, federalism
often plays an important role in the interpretation of the scope of
3 6
federal legislation.1
There have also been many recent examples of the second
point, that federalism influences members of Congress in their consideration of federal legislation. 13 7 (The debate over a national
products liability law is a recent example.) 138 These debates oc132 Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
133 Id. at 17 n.13 (citations omitted). Of course, the Court had reserved this precise
question in National League of Cities. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.

134 451 U.S. at 17.
135 Id. at 22.
136 The same concerns are evident in the "congressional consent" area. The Court has
long supported the position that "Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce" by "permit[ting] the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible." Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). When Congress authorizes state action that would
otherwise run afoul of the commerce clause, however, "congressional intent must be unmistakably clear." South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2242
(1984). As the Court stated in South-Central:
...when Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented and there is
significantly less danger that one State will be in a position to exploit others. Furthermore, if a state is in such a position, the decision to allow it is a collective one.
A rule requiring a clear expression of approval by Congress ensures that there is,
in fact, such a collective decision and reduces significantly the risk that unrepresented interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce.
Id. at 2243 (footnote omitted).
137 See P. BOBB=rr, CONSTrrurIONAL FATE 194, 274 n.21 (1982) (mentioning two examples of federalism concerns contributing to the defeat of federal legislation: (1) an amendment to the Social Security Act that would have extended coverage to state workers; and (2)
a plan to use federal funds to induce the states to adopt no-fault auto insurance plans);
Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59
TEx. L. REv. 71, 98 n.135 (1980); Kaden, supra note 7, at 848 n.8, 862, 892.
138 See, e.g., Hearingon S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1984) (opposing federal product
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curred prior to National League of Cities,' 39 and there is no reason to
suspect that federalism will not continue to play a role, even after
the doctrine's demise.
The use of federalism outlined in thepreceding paragraphs is a
far better approach than that articulated by the dissenters in Garcia.
The language employed by the dissenters 140 suggests a return to
pre-1937 days. The textual and functional justifications for such
judicial intervention are weak. Allowing the politically accountable
branches of the government to control the types of decisions in National League of Cities and Garciashould not be regarded with horror.
This conclusion is not intended as an endorsement of the Fair
Labor Standards Act' 4 1 or the vast body of federal legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce clause. As others have persuasively argued, 14 2 there are numerous reasons to be concerned
about the expansion of the federal government's powers vis-a-vis
the states. But concern about the desirability of congressional action pursuant to the commerce clause does not necessarily indicate
that the Court should regard the tenth amendment or principles of
federalism as judicially enforceable limits on congressional
authority.

The dissents ofJustices Rehnquist and O'Connor in Garcia remind us that Garciamay not be the last word. The Court may again
revive National League of Cities. Changes in personnel on the Court
in the next few years may well bring another change of direction in
this area. For the reasons outlined above, such a course of action
would be mistaken.
II. The Market Participant Doctrine: A Return to a Categorical
Approach 143 to Commerce Clause Adjudication
A.

The Case Law

On the same day it decided National League of Cities, the Court
established another state sovereignty-based exception to traditional
liability legislation in part on the ground that such legislation would be "a blatant usurpation by the Federal Government of an area of law that has always been left to the States");
see also id. at 416-20, 439-44.
139 See, e.g., Alfange, supra note 48, at 231 n.104. See generally Dorsen, The National NoFault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 45 (1974).
140 For example, the dissenters invoked the "spirit of the Constitution." Garcia, 105 S.
Ct. at 1036 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This language closely resembles the Court's reliance on "penumbras" and "emanations" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965).
141 See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 881 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (making the same
point).
142 See generally Kmiec & Diamond, New Federalism is Not Enough: The Privatization of NonPublic Goods, 7 HARv.J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1984).
143 The reference is to the Court's practice (long since abandoned) of trying to
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commerce clause principles. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,144
the Court first enunciated the market participant doctrine. Alexandria Scrap involved a Maryland statute designed to remove abandoned automobiles from the state. The statute provided a bounty
to licensed scrap dealers who received such "hulks" from the owners of the cars or from licensed wreckers. A 1974 amendment to
the state statute imposed more exacting documentation requirements on out-of-state processors than on in-state processors.
These requirements placed out-of-state processors at a disadvantage in obtaining "hulks" and thus state bounties.
In response to an out-of-state processor's commerce clause
challenge, the Court concluded that the Maryland statute did not
involve "the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned [because] Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of
hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price." 145
The Court declined to hold that "the entry by the State itself into
the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce creates a burden upon that commerce if the State
restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the
State."' 146 Instead, the Court concluded that "[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
1 47
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others."'
Significantly, the Court in Alexandria Scrap suggested that it
might have reached a different result if the market affected by the
bounty scheme had not been "created" by the state. 48 As JusticeStevens emphasized in his concurring opinion,
[i]t is important to differentiate between commerce which flourishes in a free market and commerce which owes its existence to
a state subsidy program. Our cases finding that a state regulation constitutes an impermissible burden on interstate corndistinguish commerce from mining or manufacturing and direct from indirect effects on
commerce. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 150-61.
144 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
145

146
147
148

Id. at 805, 806.

Id. at 808.
Id. at 810 (footnote omitted).
The Court stated:
[W]e note that the commerce affected by the 1974 amendment appears to have
been created, in whole or in substantial part, by the Maryland bounty scheme. We
would hesitate to hold that the Commerce Clause forbids state action reducing or
eliminating a flow of commerce dependent for its existence upon state subsidy
instead of private market forces. Because the record contains no details of the
hulk market prior to the bounty scheme, however, this issue is not clearly
presented.
Id. at 809 n.18.
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merce all dealt with restrictions that adversely affected the
operation of a free market. This case is unique because the
commerce which Maryland has "burdened" is commerce which
would not exist if Maryland had not decided to subsidize a portion of the automobile scrap-processing business. By artificially
enhancing the value of certain abandoned hulks, Maryland created a market that did not previously exist.149
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices White and Marshall, noted the conceptual link between NationalLeague of Cities and
Alexandria Scrap: "The absence of any articulated principle justifying this summary conclusion leads me to infer that the newly announced 'state sovereignty' doctrine of National League of Cities . . .
is also the motivating rationale behind this holding." 150 Justice
Brennan objected to "the Court's categorical approach. . . which
simply carves out an area of state action to which it declares the
Commerce Clause has no application." ' 151 The dissent concluded
that the constitutionality of the Maryland statute should have been
evaluated under normal commerce clause principles.
Four years later, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,' 5 2 the Court again upheld a state resident preference program on the ground that the
state had simply acted as a market participant. Reeves involved a
state owned and operated cement plant. Because of a cement
shortage, the South Dakota State Cement Commission confined the
sale of cement from the plant to state residents. In response to a
commerce clause challenge by an out-of-state cement distributor,
the Court held that the Commission's action did not violate the
commerce clause. The Court found that the state was acting as a
market participant rather than as a market regulator. The Court
emphasized that:
Restraint in this area is counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of each State "as guardian and trustee for its
people". . . and "the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own5 3independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal."'
Moreover, the Reeves Court clearly distinguished a manufactured good like cement from natural resources "like coal, timber,
wild game, or minerals," explaining that
[cement] is the end product of a complex process whereby a
costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials.
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 822 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 438-39 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's limestone or other materials used to make cement. Nor has it restricted the ability of private firms or sister States to set up
plants within its borders. . . . Moreover, petitioner has not
suggested that South Dakota possesses unique access to the
materials needed to produce cement. Whatever limits might exist on a State's ability to invoke the Alexandria Scrap exemption to
hoard resources which by5 happenstance
are found there, those
4
limits do not apply here.'
The Court observed that South Dakota had borne substantial risk in
establishing the cement plant. 15 5 In addition, invalidating the state
preference program would "rob South Dakota of the intended ben' 56
efit of its foresight, risk and industry."'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens, rejected the majority's market regulator/market participant distinction. According to Justice Powell,
[t]he application of the Commerce Clause to this case should
turn on the nature of the governmental activity involved. If a
public enterprise undertakes an "integral operatio[n] in areas of
traditional governmental functions," National League of Cities v.
Usery . . . the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant. If,
however, the State enters the private market and operates a
commercial enterprise for the advantage of its private citizens, it
may not evade
the constitutional policy against economic
57
Balkanization. 1
The Court again addressed the "market participant" doctrine
in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc. 158 In
White, the mayor of Boston issued an executive order "which required that all construction projects funded in whole or in part by
city funds, or funds which the city had the authority to administer,
should be performed by a work force consisting of at least half bona
fide residents of Boston."' 159 In response to the dissent's argument
that "regulation" rather than "market participation" was involved, 60 the Court acknowledged that some yet undefined limits
154
155

Id. at 444 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 446 n.19.

156

Id. at 446.

157 Id. at 449-50 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that he thought Alexandria
Scrap involved a "traditional governmental function," i.e., a subsidy program. Id. at 447 n. 1
(Powell, J., dissenting).
158 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
159 Id. at 205-06 (footnotes omitted).
160 Id. at 216-23 (Blackman,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent in
White emphasized that a state imposing residence preference requirements as conditions to
its contracts with private parties acts as a market regulator and not as a market participant.
The dissent concluded that such a state is thus not entitled to the market participant
exemption:
The simple unilateral refusals to deal that the Court encountered in Reeves and
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to the market participant doctrine still remained. The Court concluded, however, that "[w]herever the limits of the market participation exception may lie . . . the executive order . . . falls well
within the scope of41exandria Scrap and Reeves." 1 6 1 The municipal
activity involved in White was "a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the city . . . [was] a major participant [as]
[e]veryone affected by the order. . . [was] in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city.' "162
The Court's most recent discussion of the-market participant
doctrine appeared in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.1 63 In South-Central, however, only six Justices addressed the
issue. 164 Justice White's plurality opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, concluded that Alaska's policy of conditioning the sale of state-owned timberon the purchaser's promise
to process the timber in-state prior to export did not fall within the
protection of the market participant doctrine. In an effort to limit
the scope of the doctrine, Justice White stated:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market
in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further. The
Alexandria Scrap were relatively pure examples of a seller's or purchaser's simply
choosing its bargaining partners, "long recognized" as the right of traders in our
free enterprise system. The executive order in this case, in notable contrast, by its
terms is a direct attempt to govern private economic relationships. The power to
dictate to another those with whom he may deal is viewed with suspicion and
closely limited in the context of purely private economic relations. When exercised by government, such a power is the essence of regulation.
Id. at 218-19 (footnote omitted) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161 Id. at 211 n.7.
162 Id.
163 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
164 The primary issue in South-Central was whether Congress had authorized Alaska's
requirement that timber cut from state lands be processed in-state prior to export. The
Ninth Circuit held that a similar policy for federal lands indicated implicit congressional
approval for Alaska's policy. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890
(9th Cir. 1982). The Court stated that, before the courts are entitled to find congressional
consent to state actions that would otherwise violate the commerce clause, "congressional
intent must be unmistakably dear." 104 S. Ct. at 2242. The Court concluded:
The fact that the state policy in this case appears to be consistent with federal
policy-or even that state policy furthers the goals we might believe that Congress
had in mind-is an insufficient indicium of congressional intent. Congress acted
only with respect to federal lands; we cannot infer from that fact that it intended to
authorize a similar policy with respect to state lands. Accordingly, we reverse the
contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 2243 (footnote omitted).
Because of its ruling on the consent issue, the Ninth Circuit did not decide the market
participant question. Justice Powell and the ChiefJustice did not vote on the market participant question. Justice Powell's short opinion stated his view that a remand was appropriate to allow the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to rule on the market participant issue. Id.
at 2248 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Marshall
did not participate in the decision of the case.
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State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation,
or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of
that particular market. Unless the "market" is relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the potential of swallowing up
the rule that States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act 65
with the permissible state
purpose of fostering local industry.'
In South-Central, Justice White concluded that Alaska could "not
avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it is not
1 66
a participant."
B.

Assessment

Although it attracted less attention than the decision in National League of Cities, the Court's creation of the "market participant" doctrine has also been vigorously criticized.1 67 Justice
Brennan stated the basic objection to the doctrine in his dissent in
Alexandria Scrap:
Principles of legal analysis heretofore employed in our cases
considering claims under the Commerce Clause . . . are ig-

nored, and an area of state action plainly burdening interstate
commerce, an area not easily susceptible of principled limitations, is judicially carved out and summarily labeled as not "the
kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is
165 Id. at 2245-46 (footnote omitted) (White, J., plurality opinion).
166 Id. at 2246-47 (White, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan filed a short concurring
opinion, which included his view that "Justice White's treatment of the market-participant
doctrine and the response ofJustice Rehnquist point up the inherent weakness of the doctrine." Id. at 2247-48 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. Justice Rehnquist stated that "the line of distinction drawn in the plurality opinion between the State as
market participant and the State as market regulator is both artificial and unconvincing."
Id. at 2248 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated:
Alaska is merely paying the buyer of the timber indirectly, by means of a reduced
price, to hire Alaska residents to process the timber. Under existing precedent,
the State could accomplish that same result in any number of ways. For example,
the State could choose to sell its timber only to those companies that maintain
active primary-processing plants in Alaska. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980) (other citations omitted). Or the State could directly subsidize the primaryprocessing industry within the State. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794
(1976) (other citations omitted). The State could even pay to have the logs
processed and then enter the market only to sell processed logs. See 104 S.Ct. at
2246. It seems to me unduly formalistic to conclude that the one path chosen by
the State as best suited to promote its concerns is the path forbidden it by the
Commerce Clause.
Id. at 2248-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167 See, e.g., Blumoff, The State ProprietaryException to the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S.ILL. U.L.J. 73; Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the
Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 409 (1979); Varat, State "Citizenship "'
andInterstate Equality, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981); Note, State PurchasingActivity Excludedfrom Commerce Clause Review, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 893 (1977).
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concerned."

16 8

The market participant doctrine thus removes a particular type of
state action from the balancing approach typically used in commerce clause adjudication.16 9 In dissent, Justice Brennan refused
to treat "'what is essentially a problem of striking a balance between competing interests as an exercise in absolutes.' "170
In addition, Justice Powell's suggestion in Reeves that the Court
should decide commerce clause cases based "on the nature of the
governmental activity involved" 1'7 ignores the distinction between
a governmental entity and a private party. As the Court noted in
National League of Cities, even if acting in a "proprietary" capacity, "a
State is not merely a factor in the 'shifting economic arrangement'
of the private sector."' 172 When acting in a proprietary capacity, "a
state cannot be equated with private entrepreneurs" because "the
State responds to incentives and maximizes values that no private
economic actor would respond to or value."' 73 Moreover, parochial state legislation-whether construed as market participation
or regulation-may implicate interstate comity concerns not present when a private entity acts. 174 Regardless of their form, parochial state actions threaten fundamental commerce clause values.
All state "proprietary" activity preferring state residents, however, does not necessarily violate the commerce clause. Eliminating
the market participant exemption would simply require the courts
to subject the challenged state action to normal commerce clause
principles.' 75 Some of the conduct challenged in the market participant cases might have withstood scrutiny under commerce
clause analysis.
In fact, several commentators have approved of the Court's
support for efforts to prefer state residents in distributing state
168 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 817-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
169 For an illustration of the balancing exercise, see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970).
170 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 818-19 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 564 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
171 447 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting).
172 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849.
173 Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 137, at 89.
174 The Court's commerce clause cases have long expressed the conviction that protectionist state measures threaten interstate harmony. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Va., 262
U.S. 553, 559 (1923); West v. Kansas Nat'l Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). The Court
has often remarked that the commerce clause expresses the Framers' "conviction that in
order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States
under the Articles of Confederation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
175 See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 830-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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funds. The supporting rationales, however, differ from the Court's
reasoning. For example, one commentator has stated:
The states' independent lawmaking authority suggests an even
broader range of state power to limit public sector resources to
residents. Arguably, at least in the absence of special circumstances, only the members of a group providing a service have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Like other groups free to
combine their members' efforts to produce collective benefits to
be shared among the group, political communities, including
states, have a prima facie justification for limiting distribution1 7of6
their public goods to those who combined to provide them.
In contrast to this more traditional, "political" rationale tojustify a state's preference of its own citizens, some commentators
have relied on economic theory to support state subsidy programs.
One commentator approvingly described why state subsidy programs have received favorable judicial treatment:
The failure of commerce clause objections to a state's expenditures in favor of its own citizens follows rather neatly from the
realization that such payments are positive inducements that
stimulate output rather than restrict it to monopoly levels.
Thus, the subsidization of both cement production and in-state
automobile hulk disposal, and the channeling of state expenditures to in-state contractors, hardly can promote monopolistic
exploitation of other states. In all such cases the statutes are
likely to yield increased production levels. Although these statutes might well cause overproduction as inefficient as a monopoly's underproduction, the legislating state itself pays for its
action rather than profits from it, so that the legislature's
judg1 77
ment may be thought more reliable than parochial.
These commentators recognize that it is inappropriate to label
every state action involving a preference for state residents "protectionist" and to presume such action unconstitutional. Such an approach would likely undermine the special relationship between a
state and its residents. 7 8 Although there are doctrinal problems
with the market participant exemption, the Court's decisions reflect
an appropriate deference to state autonomy.
The subsidy theory which the commentators have emphasized1 79 may well be a more appropriate analytical foundation than
176 Varat, supra note 167, at 523; see also Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1130-35 (1980) (emphasizing state
interest in fiscal autonomy).
177 Levmore, InterstateExploitation andJudicialIntervention,69 VA. L. REV. 563, 584 (1983);
see also Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 137, at 89.
178 See Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of
Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 51, 77.
179 See, e.g., Varat, supra note 167, at 540-48; The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 70, 73-75 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 58, 61 (1976).
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the market participant doctrine. In fact, the subsidy idea has featured prominently in the cases in this area. 180 White involved the
expenditure of city funds. In Reeves, South Dakota favored its residents in the distribution of goods manufactured at a facility built
with the residents' tax dollars. In Alexandria Scrap, Maryland "created" a market through a subsidy funded by state tax dollars.
The Court has often described market participant cases in
"subsidy" terms. In New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,'8 1 the
Court characterized the Reeves market participant exemption as allowing a state to confine the sale of state-produced goods to its residents. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,18 2 the Court noted that
Reeves involved "a good publicly produced and owned in which a
State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage."
The only "market participant" case in which the state did not
prevail provides an instructive contrast. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,183 Alaska set conditions on the export of
a natural resource that happened to be located in the state. The
federal government, however, had originally purchased all of the
state's natural resources, including the timber involved in SouthCentral.18 4

The subsidy rationale provides a useful explanation for the
Court's decisions. This approach also has significant normative appeal. The market participant/market regulator distinction presents
substantial problems, 8 5 and a categorical approach to commerce
180 In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020
(1984), the Court addressed a privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
challenge to a Camden ordinance requiring that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden residents. The
Court held that the "market participant" exemption does not apply to the privileges and
immunities clause, 104 S. Ct. at 1028-29, and remanded for application of the normal privileges and immunities clause standard. Id. at 1030. The Court, however, spoke approvingly
of the challenged ordinance and emphasized the impact of the state "subsidy." The Court
stated: "The fact that Camden is expending its own funds or funds it administers in accordance with the terms of a grant is certainly a factor-perhapsthe crucialfactor-tobe considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause." Id at 1029 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that local government entities "should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures ..
" Id. at 1030 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396
(1948)). The Court observed that "[t]his caution is particularly appropriate when a government body is merely setting conditions on the expenditure of funds it controls." Id.
181 455 U.S. 331, 338-39 n.6 (1982).
182 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
183 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
184 See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 n.1l (1978). As one commentator has
noted, "[i]n any case where the state's wealth does not derive from the contributions of
residents acting through the state, there is good reason to adhere strictly to obligations of
interstate equality" and "[t]hat is especially true when the national government conveys
property to a state without compensation." Varat, supra note 167, at 557 n.238.
185 See, e.g., Varat, supra note 167, at 501-08.
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clause adjudication has provoked a more general objection. 186 In
contrast, allowing state "subsidies" under normal dormant commerce clause analysis would afford the states significant freedom
18 7
without risk to the rest of the states.
The "subsidy" idea, however, could be interpreted too
broadly. In South-Central, Alaska analogized its requirement that
timber purchased from state land be partially processed within
Alaska to the state "subsidy" approved in Alexandria Scrap.' 88 In a
recent commerce clause case, 189 Hawaii argued that "foregone revenues" are equivalent to a subsidy and thus not invalid under the
commerce clause. If foregone revenues were equated to a subsidy,
the states would be able to use their taxing power to eviscerate the
protections of the commerce clause. When a state spends funds
from the state treasury, we can have some confidence that "the
state legislature has considered the burdens and benefits of its action."190 Simply foregoing revenues, however, should be viewed as

state regulatory action, and thus subject to traditional commerce
clause restraints. Moreover, a state's expenditure of its own funds
is not likely to have significant adverse effects on nonresidents.
Therefore, deference to such state action is appropriate under both
the political and economic rationales discussed above.
III.

State Action Immunity: An Appropriate Accommodation?
A.

The Case Law

Federal-state conflicts are standard fare in the Court's commerce clause cases. Federalism issues often arise in less traditional
contexts as well. For example, the Burger Court has given a great
deal of attention to federalism issues in deciding state action cases
in the antitrust area.
This section is not designed to present a comprehensive analysis of the Court's decisions in the area. 19 1 Rather, this section dis186 In his dissent in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, Justice Brennan stated: "I cannot
agree that well-established principles for analyzing claims under the Commerce Clause are
inapplicable. . . merely because the Court somehow categorically determines that the instant case involves 'a burden which the Commerce Clause was [not] intended to make suspect.' " 426 U.S. at 818 (quoting majority opinion) (Brennan,J., dissenting); see The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, supra note 179, at 74.
187 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
188 South-Central, 104 S.Ct. at 2244.
189 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 3056 (1984).
190 Levmore, supra note 177, at 585.
191 There has been a tremendous volume of commentary in this area. See generally
Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L. REv. 435 (1981); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF L. & ECON. 23 (1983); Levmore,
supra note 177; Verkuil, State Action, Due Process andAntitrust: Reflections on Parkerv. Brown, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975).
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cusses the relationship between the state action cases and the
constitutionally-based, state sovereignty exemptions discussed in
sections I and II.192
The landmark case in the state action area is Parkerv. Brown.19 3
In Parker, the Court considered whether a raisin marketing program
adopted under the California Agricultural Prorate Act violated the
Sherman Act, was preempted by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, or was invalid under the commerce clause. California produced almost all of the raisins consumed in the United
States and nearly half the world supply. Ninety to ninety-five percent of the raisins grown in California were shipped in interstate or
foreign commerce. The raisin marketing program at issue in Parker
restricted competition among raisin growers and maintained prices.
In considering the validity of this program under the Sherman
Act, the Court assumed that the program would have violated the
Sherman Act if it had been entered into solely by private parties.
The Court also presupposed that Congress could have prohibited a
state from maintaining such a stabilization program. 19 4 Nevertheless, the Court concluded:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature ....

The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as

such, and gives no hint that it was intended
95 to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.'
The Court also found that the California program was not preempted by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937196
and that it was not invalid under the commerce clause. 9 7 In both
its preemption and commerce clause discussions, the Court emphasized that the national government had contributed to, and cooper192 Other commentators have discussed the constitutional underpinnings of Parker. See
generally Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust
Context: Parker v. Brown in ConstitutionalPerspective, 1978 DuKE L.J. 389; Davidson & Butters,
Parkerand Usery: Portended ConstitutionalLimits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State
Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575 (1978); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A
Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. REv.
1099 (1981).
193 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown
State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976) (explaining historical roots of state action
doctrine).
194 317 U.S. at 350.
195 Id. at 350-51. In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S.
Ct. 1721 (1985), the Court stated: "The Parker decision was premised on the assumption
that Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, did not intend to compromise the States' ability to regulate their domestic commerce." Id. at 1726 (footnote omitted).
196 317 U.S. at 352-59.
197 Id. at 359-68.
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ated with, California in establishing the marketing program. 198
Parker did not, of course, answer all questions about the scope
of the state action doctrine. For thirty years, however, the Court
exhibited little interest in the doctrine.1 99 The Burger Court has
shown a renewed interest in the area, and the Court has issued a
steady flow of state action decisions since 1975.200
Although some questions remain, the basic outlines of the state
action doctrine have become fairly well established.2 0 ' When the
challenged action is that of the state, acting as sovereign, the action
is not subject to the Sherman Act. 20 2 When the challenged activity
is not directly that of the state itself, the Court will consider
whether the challenged restraint is "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and whether the policy is "actively supervised" by the state. 20 3 A state statute will not afford
protection from Sherman Act scrutiny "if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy." 20 4 In addition,
198 See notes 196-97 supra and accompanying text. The Court's emphasis on federal approval was considered significant in later commerce clause cases. For example, in H. P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court emphasized that in Parker the
United States Secretary of Agriculture had affirmatively cooperated in promoting the state
program and had supported it with substantial federal loans. In Hood the Court clearly
indicated that affirmative expressions of federal approval are necessary if state actions
otherwise inconsistent with the commerce clause are to withstand scrutiny. H. P. Hood &
Sons, 336 U.S. at 537.
199 See Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1374-75 (1978).
200 See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 1721
(1985); Town ofHallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 104
S. Ct. 1989 (1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
201 The Court recently answered several open questions. In Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985), the Court decided that neither active state supervision
nor state compulsion is required to exempt a municipality's conduct from the antitrust laws.
In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 1721 (1985), the
Court decided that a private party may avail itself of state action immunity in the absence of
state compulsion as long as the two prong Midcal test is satisfied. There are still open
questions remaining. See Town of Hallie, 105 S.Ct. at 1720 n.10 (leaving open the question
of whether active state supervision is required when the actor is a state agency).
202 See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 1996-98 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977).
203 See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980).
204 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). Whether a state regulatory
scheme is preempted by the federal antitrust laws poses a difficult question. See, e.g., Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
1393 (1985). Another difficult question is whether a state statute that would be invalidated
under preemption standards can be "saved" by the state action doctrine. See Battipaglia,
745 F.2d at 176-77 (discussing, but not resolving, this question); Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F.
Supp. 116, 121-24 (D. Or. 1984) (applying state action doctrine to save a statute that would

1985]

COMMERCE CLAUSE

municipal conduct is protected by the state action doctrine if the
municipality acts pursuant to a dearly articulated state policy, the
municipality's actions need neither be compelled nor actively supervised by the state. 20 5 Moreover, since the passage of the Local
Goverment Antitrust Act of 1984,206 local governments are only
subject to antitrust suits seeking injunctive relief. Local governments are thus exempt from treble damages actions under the antitrust laws.
The Court has often noted that the state action doctrine rests
on principles of federalism and state sovereignty. 20 7 And as two
commentators have suggested:
[I]t seems that the Court is. . .relying on more general, constitutionally derived principles of federalism to strike a balance between federal and state interests. This suggests that the
different interpretations of Parker reflect the justices' individual
perceptions of the source and scope
of constitutional limitations
20 8
on the reach of the antitrust laws.
otherwise have been preempted). The federal courts should allow state statutes to stand
under the supremacy clause in the absence of clear congressional intent to supersede state
law. In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), Justice
Rehnquist stated the proper approach to preemption inquiry:
Because pre-emption treads on the very sensitive area of federal-state relations,
this Court is "reluctant to infer preemption,". . . and the presumption is that preemption is not to be found absent the clear and manifest intention of Congress
that the federal Act should supersede the police powers of the States.
455 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Under such an approach,
relatively few state laws would be preempted. This position is probably closest to the intent
of Congress. See Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1334-35
(1982). The Congress that enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 probably did not intend to
override contrary state laws. Congress can always clarify its intent. Thus, most state
choices to displace competition should be upheld, subject to normal dormant commerce
clause scrutiny.
205 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985). See generally Lopatka,
State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FoPRDHAM L. REV. 23
(1984).
206 The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750, was
passed on Oct. 10 and signed by President Reagan on Oct. 24, 1984. This Act was
prompted by congressional concern about the flood of antitrust suits against municipalities
(in particular, the $28.5 million verdict against the Village of Grayslake, Lake County, and
three local officials) and the FTC's filing of antitrust complaints against New Orleans and
Minneapolis for alleged antitrust violations arising from taxi regulations. See FTC Suits Spur
Congress to Protect Citiesfrom PayingAntitrust Damages, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 18, 1984, at 1569-72.
The Act protects "local governments" from damage suits under the antitrust laws, but allows suits seeking injunctive relief. Congress, therefore, made it clear that the antitrust
laws do indeed apply to local governments, but limited the available relief.
207 Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S.Ct. at 1729 (stating that "[t]he Parker doctrine represents an attempt to resolve conflicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the
goal of the antitrust laws ....");Hoover, 104 S.Ct. at 1995; Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53 ("the
Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress' intention to embody in the Sherman Act
the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under
our Constitution").
208 Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 192, at 414.
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Certain Justices have highlighted eleventh amendment concerns,
while others have asserted the relevance of tenth amendment
principles.
For example, Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Cantor, which
described the state action doctrine as a principle of sovereign immunity, resembles eleventh amendment analysis. Justice Stevens
stated: "[Mr. ChiefJustice Stone] carefully selected language which
plainly limited the Court's holding [in Parker] to official action taken
by state officials." 20 9 As several commentators have noted, 2 10 this
focus on the defendant's identity echoes eleventh amendment concerns. 2 11 The Court has relied on eleventh amendment principles
2 12
in other state action cases as well.
Other opinions have emphasized tenth amendment values.
The Chief Justice's opinion in Lafayette explicitly linked the commerce clause concerns of National League of Cities to the Parker state
action doctrine.2 1 3 Justice Stewart's dissent in Lafayette also noted a
connection between the two cases. 21 4 Moreover, in his concurring
opinion in Cantor,2 15 Justice Blackmun outlined a balancing test re2 16
sembling his proposal in National League of Cities.
Justice Rehnquist and others contend that Parker raises
supremacy clause issues. 2 17 For example, in Boulder, Justice Rehnquist declared: "The question addressed in Parker and in this case
is . . .whether statutes, ordinances, and regulations enacted as an
act of government are pre-empted by the Sherman Act under the operation of the Supremacy Clause." 2 18 Such a question "implicates
209
210

Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591 (1976) (footnote omitted).
Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 192, at 414-19; Note, CrawlingOutfrom Under Boulder,

34 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 303, 321-24 (1983-84).

211 See also Boulder, 455 U.S. at 58-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 (relying on eleventh amendment cases to support principle
that cities are not sovereign entities). The dissent criticized the Court's reliance on eleventh amendment concepts. Id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 423-24 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part).
214 Id. at 430, 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
215 428 U.S. at 610-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
216 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun,J., concurring). Many lower court decisions have, at least
implicitly, noted the connection between tenth amendment principles and the state action
doctrine. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 384-85, 384 n.18 (7th
Cir. 1983), afd, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d
1187, 1195-97 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-69 (W.D. Mo. 1982), affrd, 705 F.2d
1005, 1014 n.13 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1985); see also
Shenefield, The Parkerv. Brown State Action Doctrineand the New FederalismofAntitrust, 51 ANTITRUST LJ. 337, 339 (1983) (discussing interplay between Parkerand NationalLeague of Cities);
The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 273-78 (1982).
217 Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); Cantor,428 U.S. at 637 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Handler, supra note 205, at 1330-38; Handler, supra note 200, at 1374-88; Handler, supra note 194, at 1.
218 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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our basic notions of federalism." 2' 9 According to Justice Rehnquist, "[t]he Parker doctrine correctly holds that the federal interest
in protecting and fostering competition is not infringed so long as
the state or local regulation is so structured to ensure that it is truly
the government, and not the regulated private entities, which is re2 20
placing competition with regulation."
B.

Assessment

The Court's state action decisions in many ways represent basic constitutional decisions about the role of the states in our federal system. Considering the constitutional nature of the antitrust
laws, 22 1 this characterization of the Court's state action decisions
should not be surprising. The problems that surface in the state
action area resemble those with which the Burger Court has struggled in other areas involving federal/state conflicts. The governmental/proprietary debate in Lafayette22 2 exemplifies this type of
conflict. This similarity suggests that the analysis proposed in sections I and II of this article should also be applied in the state action
context.
The Burger Court's state action decisions have been severely
criticized. For example, in discussing a recent decision in the area,
one commentator stated: "I believe [Hoover v. Ronwin]2 23 demonstrates the necessity for congressional action, given the inability of
the Court to deal with this area in anything but the most regrettably
formalistic terms." 22 4 Another commentator has opined that "the
Court's opaque and conflicting opinions in the cases have often defied interpretation."225
Although the Burger Court's decisions in this area may lack
consistency, 2 26 the approach enunciated in Parker nevertheless is
219 Id. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); Baxter,
Separation of Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60
TEx. L. REv. 661, 663 (1982).
222 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
223 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
224 Campbell, Supreme Court Update - State Action Immunity from Antitrust Law, 53 ANnTRUST LJ. 429, 429 (1984).
225 Page, supra note 192, at 1101.
226 Prior to Town of Hallie and Southern Motor Carriers,the Burger Court had narrowed the

scope of the state action doctrine. This result was probably attributable to the recognition
that the doctrine assisted the states in sheltering conduct with clear anticompetitive consequences. See Easterbrook, supra note 191, at 27; Handler, supra note 204, at 1331. This
"thread" in the cases contradicts the view that the Burger Court has exhibited a solicitude

for state sovereignty. This earlier narrowing of the state action doctrine illustrates both the
difficulty of the issues involved in areas of federal-state conflict and the sharp split in the
Court on these issues. Many of the Court's state action decisions have been decided by
close votes, with the dissenters in Garcia often dissenting in cases that have restricted the
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proper. While the impact of uncertainty in legal rules should not
be trivialized, the Court's basic approach is sound. And, more importantly for this article's focus, this approach accords appropriate
recognition to the states' role in our federal system.
The Court's state action decisions follow the "rule of statutory
construction" approach outlined in section I. Greatly influenced by
federalism concerns, the Court has refused to apply federal legislation to certain state actions absent clear congressional intent. This
approach avoids the question of whether Congress could constitutionally apply the Sherman Act to challenged state conduct. 2 27 In
addition, Congress is forced to act, if it feels action is necessary. 2 28
This approach does not preclude all challenges to allegedly
anticompetitive state actions. 22 9 State action is still subject to normal commerce clause principles. Several commentators have recently supported a similar approach. 2 30 The primacy of normal
commerce clause principles respects state choices in the economic
sphere, 23 ' while preventing state actions that adversely affect
23 2
nonresidents.
scope of Parker. For example, in Boulder, Justice Rehnquist was joined in dissent by the
Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor. In its most recent decisions in the state action area,
Town of Hallie and Southern Motor Carriers,which were decided shortly after Garcia, the Court
greatly expanded the scope of the state action doctrine and gave states and municipalities
significantly greater freedom to act in this area. As Garcia and the state action cases illustrate, the Burger Court has not always moved in a straight line in these "state sovereignty"
cases. This does not, however, undermine the position that the Burger Court has generally
been far more active than the Warren Court in highlighting the states' importance in our
federal system.
227 After Garcia, however, the answer to this constitutional question should be clear in
nearly all cases.
228 In Southern Motors Carriers,Justice Powell stated: "After over 40 years of Congressional acquiescence, we are unwilling to abandon the Parker doctrine." 105 S. Ct. 1726
n. 18. As the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 illustrates, Congress will act to correct the Court's judgments in this area, if Congress believes it is important to do so.
229 Political recourse is always possible.
230 See Levmore, supra note 177, at 626-29; Page, supra note 192, at 1107. See generally
Easterbrook, supra note 191.
231 Several commentators have correctly concluded that the Court should not dictate the
manner in which the state must exercise its economic choices. See Easterbrook, supra note
191, at 36-40; Page, supra note 192, at 1136-38. Others have also correctly concluded that
the Court should accord municipalities the same treatment states receive. See Easterbrook,
supra note 191, at 36-38; Lopatka, supra note 205, at 52-77.
232 The Court-particularly in recent years-has emphasized that the negative implications of the commerce clause help ensure that those harmed by a governmental act are
represented in the political body making the decision. The Court has exercised the "strictest scrutiny" when faced with facially discriminatory legislation, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979), in part
because out-of-state parties are not represented in the political body enacting the discriminatory legislation. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45
n.2 (1940); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2
(1938); O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REv. 395, 400
(1982); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705-08
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Deference to state economic decisions in the absence of significant out-of-state consequences is consistent with Parker's emphasis
on federalism. 23 3 Moreover, this approach is far superior to the
balancing approach advanced in some judicial decisions and by certain commentators. 234 Such a balancing approach would resurrect
the judicial attitude of the substantive due process era, when the
23 5
courts regularly second-guessed state economic choices.
IV.

Conclusion: An Overall Assessment

The Burger Court has manifested a solicitude for state sovereignty in a variety of areas. This concern for state sovereignty influenced the Court's creation of two limitations on the scope of the
commerce clause-the National League of Cities doctrine, which has
now been abandoned, and the market participant doctrine, which
still remains good law. These state sovereignty-based limitations
on the commerce clause must be regarded as failures, at least on a
doctrinal level. The standards the Court has struggled to articulate
have proved unworkable. And substantial clarification of these
standards in the foreseeable future is improbable. Moreover, the
Court has failed to justify its role in declaring particular state actions to be beyond the scope of commerce clause scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the Court's opinions in this area have been beneficial. First, the Court has highlighted the importance of state soy(1984); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 124, 128 n.14.
This "political representation" rationale dovetails with the economic approach advanced by
certain commentators. For example, Professor Levmore has stated that "the state action
exemption should be reformulated to exclude circumstances ripe for interstate exploitation. The doctrine, for example, should exempt typical state regulation of a local electric
utility but should not protect regulation that 'exports' monopoly burdens to nonresidents."
Levmore, supra note 177, at 627; see also Easterbrook, supra note 191, at 45-50. Determining
whether a challenged state scheme has significant out-of-state effects will often raise difficult questions. See, e.g., Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425,
444-46 (1982) (criticizing the Court's decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S.
117 (1978)); O'Fallon, supra at 418-19 (criticizing the Court's decision in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981)). Despite these difficulties, the approach outlined in the text does focus on the relevant inquiry.
233 This position is not intended to convey approval of state schemes that restrict competition. Rather, deference is desirable unless Congress has clearly expressed an intent to
displace such laws. The adverse impact of anticompetitive regulations will fall principally
on those who have a voice in the political process.
234 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 192, at 438-41; Campbell, supra note 224, at 433;
Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Under the Antitrust
'Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 31 (1979); Posner, The ProperRelationship Between State Regulationand
the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formulafor Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974).
235 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTRusT LAw 215c (1978); Page, supra note 192, at 1122-25. See generally Verkuil, supra
note 191.
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ereignty. This effort has fostered the continuing dialogue about the
role of the states in our federal system. 23 6 Second, the Court's de23 7
cisions have sparked an outpouring of scholarly commentary.
This commentary has focused attention on the distribution of
power between the national government and the states and has
prompted several strong defenses of federalism. 23 8 Finally, in certain instances, the Court's decisions have caused Congress to reconsider legislation that would have significantly affected state and
local governments. These effects must be regarded as beneficial,
particularly if one shares the view that a rethinking of the relationship between the federal government and states is necessary. 23 9
Despite the potential benefits, the Court should abandon the
market participant doctrine, just as it abandoned National League of
Cities. The practice of carving out "islands of state autonomy" is
misguided. In the National League of Cities context, as the Garcia majority stated, the Court should rely on the national political process.
And in the market participant area, the Court should rely on normal dormant commerce clause principles to protect state
240
sovereignty.
Although the Court should not use the tenth amendment or
general notions of federalism as judicially enforceable limits on the
commerce power, federalism should still play a significant role.
The Court should rely on principles of federalism to interpret federal statutes and should require that Congress clearly state its intent to "interfere" with state and local matters. With the
reservations previously discussed, the Court's state action doctrine
illustrates how this process can and should work. The "subsidy"
theory, as an analytical substitute for the market participant doctrine, affords significant freedom to the states, without seriously
jeopardizing other states' interests.
236 This type of dialogue is typical in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Wellington,
Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REv. 326, 335 (1983). Professor Bobbitt describes the Court's
decision in National League of Cities as the Court's exercise of a "cueing" function: "[W]e
may come to think that the case is not a major doctrinal turn but a cue to a fellow constitutional actor, an incitement to Congress to renew its traditional role as protector of the
states." P. BoBBrrr, supra note 137, at 194.
237 Many of the books and articles cited throughout this article were written in response
to the Court's decisions in the area, and thus focus primarily on doctrinal matters. Other
articles have focused more on historical sources. See, e.g., Diamond, The Federalist. Neithera
National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both, 86 YALE LJ. 1273 (1977).
238 See, e.g., Kmiec & Diamond, supra note 142, at 340-51. See generally Nagel, supra note
Ill.
239 See generally Kmiec & Diamond, supra note 142 (concluding that constitutional federalism is greatly unbalanced and proposing both a decentralization of governmental activity
and a privatization of nonpublic goods).
240 The problem facing those who agree that the federal government is too large vis-avis the states is that these arguments have typically lost in the political arena. Scalia, The
Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 20 (1982).
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The Burger Court's state sovereignty doctrines discussed in
this article have largely been failures. The Court has, however,
contributed significantly to the continuing debate about an important issue of governmental structure. As this process continues, a
more appropriate accommodation of federal and state interests may
be reached.

